@inproceedings{ccs26-thunderbolt,
author = {Wen, Hongbo and Liu, Hanzhi and Chen, Yanju and Ke, Jingyu and Malkhi, Dahlia and Feng, Yu},
title = {Thunderbolt: Fast Asynchronous Off-Chain Bitcoin Transfers},
year = {2026},
isbn = {9798400728716},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3830454.3846597},
doi = {10.1145/3830454.3846597},
abstract = {We present Thunderbolt, an off-chain protocol that transfers Bitcoin UTXO ownership with seconds-scale latency, requires no channel graph, routing, or liquidity rebalancing, and lets the recipient be offline during transfer. A single UTXO is locked once on-chain under a fixed public key shared by the current holder and a threshold committee; ownership then passes through an unbounded sequence of holders; each transfer is a purely off-chain, asynchronous operation at zero on-chain cost, and the chain sees exactly two transactions regardless of how many transfers occur.The core invariant is an algebraic cancellation: at each transfer the recipient's fresh secret is added to the holder's share and subtracted from the committee's share, so both shares rotate while the key stays fixed. To enforce this, the recipient publishes an invoice to a shared append-only ledger (the Thunderbolt Ledger): a public commitment and encrypted copies for himself and the committee, with a zero-knowledge proof that all three encode the same secret. The sender fetches and verifies the invoice, homomorphically folds her secret into the recipient's ciphertext, and publishes the resulting ownership credential under a second zero-knowledge proof. Both proofs use a single Sigma-protocol response to force the same witness across elliptic-curve and Paillier equations, requiring no trusted setup. The committee operates under a standard (t,n)-threshold honest-majority assumption, tolerating up to t−1 corrupt members, and subtracts the fresh secret from its share. Distinct fresh secrets and context identifiers let UTXOs transfer in parallel. On our benchmark machine, a complete off-chain transfer finishes in 1022 ms with 3.8 KB of proofs. General-purpose SNARK backends are far slower on these relations: a reduced-parameter instantiation already proves two orders of magnitude slower, and a faithful one at the deployed modulus exhausts consumer memory.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2026 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
pages = {3085–3099},
numpages = {15},
keywords = {bitcoin, off-chain transfers, verifiable encryption, paillier cryptosystem, zero-knowledge proofs, payment channels},
location = {The Hague, Netherlands},
series = {CCS '26}
}
